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# Safetywashing: Do AI Safety Benchmarks Actually Measure Safety Progress?

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## Abstract

As artificial intelligence systems grow more powerful, there has been increasing interest in “AI safety” research to address emerging and future risks. However, the field of AI safety remains poorly defined and inconsistently measured, leading to confusion about how researchers can contribute. This lack of clarity is compounded by the unclear relationship between AI safety benchmarks and upstream general capabilities (e.g., general knowledge and reasoning). To address these issues, we conduct a comprehensive meta-analysis of AI safety benchmarks, empirically analyzing their correlation with general capabilities across dozens of models and providing a survey of existing directions in AI safety. Our findings reveal that many safety benchmarks highly correlate with both upstream model capabilities and training compute, potentially enabling “safetywashing”—where capability improvements are misrepresented as safety advancements. Based on these findings, we propose an empirical foundation for developing more meaningful safety metrics and define AI safety in a machine learning research context as a set of clearly delineated research goals that are empirically separable from generic capabilities advancements. In doing so, we aim to provide a more rigorous framework for AI safety research, advancing the science of safety evaluations and clarifying the path towards measurable progress.

## 1 Introduction

*“For better or worse, benchmarks shape a field.” — David Patterson*

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems have rapidly advanced in recent years and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes scenarios. This has led to growing interest in ensuring that AI systems are not only more generally capable, but also more trustworthy and safe. Under the umbrella of AI safety research, a wide variety of benchmarks have been proposed that claim to measure desirable safety properties, distinct from the general capabilities of models. This includes the extent to which models are fair [1], reliable [2], honest [3], or less prone to malicious use [4]. In each case, intuitively plausible arguments can be given for why the model property is not mainly determined by upstream general model capabilities. However, these intuitive verbal arguments have rarely been empirically scrutinized and often admit counterarguments that are equally convincing. This raises the question of

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


Figure 1: Across various safety areas, we investigate whether common safety benchmarks are correlated with capabilities and compute used, ultimately obscuring differential safety progress.

what exactly constitutes advancements in “AI safety” from an AI developer R&D perspective, how to measure it, and how to distinguish it from upstream general capabilities.

Distinguishing safety properties from the model’s upstream general capabilities is challenging because they are intertwined. More capable AI systems are less likely to cause random accidents, but at the same time could cause more harm if used maliciously. AI systems that are better aligned with human preferences may avoid hazardous behavior but may also be far more capable because humans prefer intelligent assistants. This complicated relationship obscures *differential safety progress*, or technical improvements that disproportionately improve safety properties of AI systems relative to other attributes. In computer systems, for example, performance and security improvements are more readily distinguishable; were they as intertwined as in AI, mere speed enhancements might be misrepresented as security research. **In the worst case, this blurred distinction can be an instrument for safetywashing**, where techniques that do not disproportionately contribute to the safety properties of AI systems relative to other properties are misconstrued as “safety research.”

Historically, there have been two approaches for identifying machine learning research topics for differentially improving the safety properties of AI systems. One paradigm is alignment theory, a highly discursive, top-down, and intuition-driven approach that backchains from high-level risks to concrete empirical machine learning subproblems. The other approach is bottom-up and involves patching current systematic flaws in AI systems. An example of the former is alignment of large language models (LLMs) to human preferences [5]. An example of the latter is distribution shift robustness [6]. However, both approaches guide research problem selection that may not be sufficiently distinct from latent upstream capabilities, consequently opening the door to safetywashing.

In this paper, we present a third approach to identifying distinct AI safety research topics and benchmarks: we empirically measure whether common safety benchmarks are highly correlated with capabilities and training compute across common chat models. **Instead of relying on intuitive arguments, we compute correlations between safety metrics and both a general capabilities** component (explaining around 70% of model performance across benchmarks) and raw training compute. While a high correlation indicates that a safety benchmark is measuring capabilities as a latent upstream factor—and is thus prone to safetywashing—a low correlation does not necessarily speak to the quality of the benchmark.

In extensive experiments across dozens of models and safety benchmarks, we find that many safety benchmarks have high correlations with capabilities. Our findings suggest that merely improving general capabilities (e.g., through scaling parameters and training data [7, 8]) can lead to increased performance across many safety benchmarks. This is troubling because AI safety research should aim to enhance model safety beyond the standard development trajectory. Separately, we find that alignment philosophy’s intuitive arguments can mislead researchers, since it is highly disconnected

## Capabilities-correlated safety benchmarks create confusion and enable misrepresentation




Figure 2: The tight connection between many safety properties and capabilities can enable safetywashing, where capabilities advancements (e.g., training a larger model) can be advertised as progress on “AI safety.” This confuses the research community to the developments that have occurred, distorting the academic discourse.

from empirical measurements. We find that it is difficult to predict ahead of time which benchmarks are uncorrelated with general capabilities. This shows that empirical measurement is needed, so we recommend that future safety benchmarks report their correlation with upstream model capabilities. Ultimately, we provide empirical clarity to the concept of “AI safety” as a set of clear, delineated research goals that are empirically separable from generic capabilities research. Experiment code can be found [here](#).

## 2 Related Work

**Science of evaluations.** The development and analysis of benchmarks for evaluating AI models, particularly LLMs, encodes desirable properties of models and sets goals for guiding model development. Previous work has further aimed to build open-source evaluation platforms [9, 10], analyze model scaling through benchmarks [7, 8, 11–21], conduct factor analysis across benchmarks [22], and predict downstream capabilities [23–33]. Furthermore, concurrent work has used principal component analysis to analyze performance between benchmarks [34]. However, while many safety benchmarks have been made, no works to date have conducted an empirical meta-analysis of safety benchmarks to investigate the entanglement between safety benchmark scores and upstream model capabilities.

**Differential safety progress.** Differential safety progress in AI systems refers to the relative advancement of safety properties compared to overall capabilities [35]. Some methods have resulted in differential progress in AI safety [36–38] by demonstrating marked improvements in model robustness without necessarily increasing general upstream capabilities. These techniques exemplify the potential for targeted safety improvements that are orthogonal to the default trajectory driven by capability enhancements. Hendrycks and Mazeika [39] emphasize the goal of steering AI development towards safer systems that deviate positively from the default capability trajectory; they present a philosophical discussion with narrow empirical analysis.

## 3 Methods

We derive a simple and highly general methodology for determining whether a safety benchmark is entangled with upstream model capabilities.

**Capabilities score.** To establish a capabilities baseline, we collect scores from  $m$  models on  $b$  capabilities benchmarks (e.g., MMLU [40], Winogrande [41], GSM8K [42]). We form a matrix of results from benchmarks, which we call the benchmark matrix  $B \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times b}$ , where  $B_{ij}$  is the score of the  $i$ th model on the  $j$ th benchmark. We normalize each column of  $B$  to have mean 0 and variance 1. We perform Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on  $B$  to identify the unit first principal component vector  $PC_1$ . The capabilities score for each model is given by projecting the model’s benchmark scores onto  $PC_1$ . Because  $PC_1$  of  $B$  represents the direction in the space of benchmark performances




Figure 3: *Step 1:* We produce a matrix of scores for a set of language models evaluated on a set of capabilities and safety benchmarks. *Step 2:* We extract the first principal component of the capabilities benchmarks and use it to compute a capabilities score for each model. *Step 3:* We identify whether safety benchmarks have high capabilities correlations using Spearman’s correlation.

along which models vary the most, we obtain a general measure of the model’s capabilities. The capabilities score for model  $i$  is

$$\text{Capabilities Score}_i = (B \cdot \text{PC}_1)_i \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, m.$$

**Capabilities correlation.** For each safety benchmark, we evaluate the same set of  $m$  models, redefine metrics such that a higher score indicates improved safety<sup>2</sup>, and normalize the safety benchmark scores to mean 0 and variance 1. We compute the Spearman correlation across models between the capabilities scores and the safety benchmark scores:

$$\text{Capabilities Correlation} = \text{corr}_{\text{models}}(\text{Capabilities Score}, \text{Safety Benchmark}).$$

A high correlation indicates the benchmark likely measures capabilities rather than distinct safety attributes. A low correlation indicates the benchmarks is measuring attributes distinct from general capabilities, while a negative correlation indicates models obtain worse safety properties as upstream model capabilities increase.

**Compute correlation.** Similarly to the capabilities correlation metric, we also report compute correlation. We collect training compute estimates for models where the FLOP count is publicly known (from [43]) or estimate FLOPs as  $6 \cdot \text{Training Tokens} \cdot \text{Params}$ , following [12]. While some information is not publicly available, we obtain FLOP estimates for the vast majority of models in our full set of  $m$  models (i.e. 21 out of 26 chat fine-tuned models). We compute the Spearman correlation across models between the training compute and the safety benchmark scores:

$$\text{Compute Correlation} = \text{corr}_{\text{models}}(\text{Training FLOPs}, \text{Safety Benchmark}).$$

This metric reinforces the capabilities correlation metric, with our results in later sections showing that compute alone accounts for strong correlations in many cases. A high compute correlation indicates that a safety benchmark is mostly tracking how much compute was spent to train a model.

**Experimental setup for language models.** We calculate the capabilities component from the following benchmarks: LogiQA [44], PIQA [45], Hellaswag [46], Winogrande [41], COPA [47],

<sup>2</sup>A subset of score calculations were changed to ensure higher benchmark scores indicate greater safety across metrics. For example, proportion of successful attacks, which is often reported for adversarial robustness, were recalculated as proportion of failed attacks.

Model	Capabilities Score
Mixtral 8x22B Instruct v0.1	4.85
Llama-3 70B Instruct	4.58
Llama-3 8B Instruct	1.10
Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2	0.72
Falcon 40B Instruct	0.54
Llama-2 7B Chat	-1.86
Gemma-1.1 2B Instruct	-4.07
Qwen-1.5 0.5B-Chat	-7.56

Table 1: Relative capabilities scores for a subset of chat models.

MedQA [48], ARC Challenge [49], MMLU [40], MATH [50], LAMBADA [51], GSM8K [42], and BBH [52]. We used a diverse set of model classes and derivatives to avoid skewing results towards any particular model architecture, listing the 27 base models and 26 chat/instruct fine-tuned models used for our analysis in the Appendix. **Running separate analyses for base and chat models, we find that 78.3% and 70.8% of variance** is captured by the capabilities component, respectively. Our reported results use instruct fine-tuned models by default; generally, we find the forthcoming analysis does not change markedly when using base models.

**Experimental setup for vision models.** For vision models, we use the accuracy of ImageNet as the capabilities component. We list the 63 adversarially trained models (used for vision adversarial robustness results) and 44 standard models (used for calibration results) in Appendix A.1.

## 4 Human Values

Human values are the fundamental beliefs and ideals that guide human behavior and decision-making; researchers often aim to encode these values in AI systems. We assess common benchmarks for alignment and helpfulness (4.1), machine ethics (4.2), and bias (4.3), asking whether such measurements are determined primarily by upstream model capabilities and compute scale.

### 4.1 Alignment

**Area Overview.** Alignment refers to how well AI systems follow the goals of their operators, accurately specifying and implementing the desired goals without unintended consequences or misinterpretations. Common alignment evaluations assess AI systems’ helpfulness or instruction-following, with the aim to closely align the AI systems’ responses with human preferences.

**Datasets.** We describe the alignment benchmarks that we use below. Example inputs and outputs from these benchmarks are shown in Figure 5.

1. *LMSYS Chatbot Arena* [53] is a crowdsourced evaluation platform where users interact with two anonymous AI models simultaneously. Users pose questions to both models and vote for the response they prefer. The platform uses these votes to generate an Elo ranking system, providing a leaderboard of AI model performance based on public preferences.
2. *MT-Bench* [53] is a conversation benchmark consisting of 80 high-quality multi-turn questions. LLMs are used to evaluate responses, with the evaluation criteria designed to align closely with human preferences as determined through crowdsourcing.




Figure 4: A safety benchmark with a high correlation and high slope with respect to upstream model capabilities and training compute can be used for safetywashing.




Figure 5: Alignment benchmarks assess AI systems’ ability to produce outputs that humans prefer.

## Dubious Intuitive Arguments For and Against Researching “Alignment”

*In this section we will cover key intuitive arguments for and against alignment, and thereby show how intuitive arguments and their underlying distinctions can be a highly fragile and unreliable guide for determining a research area’s relation to upstream general capabilities and tractability.*

We should work on alignment because:

**1: Misinterpretation Risks.** AIs could catastrophically fail to capture and abide by human intentions. “A system that is optimizing a function of  $n$  variables, where the objective depends on a subset of size  $k < n$ , will often set the remaining unconstrained variables to extreme values; if one of those unconstrained variables is actually something we care about, the solution found may be highly undesirable. This is essentially the old story of the genie in the lamp, or the sorcerer’s apprentice, or King Midas: you get exactly what you asked for, not what you wanted.” AIs smarter than us can always outthink us and find loopholes in our requests; trying to plug all the holes is hopeless, like patching all the holes in the tax code [54, 55].

**2: Misgeneralization vs. Goal Misgeneralization Distinction.** Even if alignment is highly correlated with capabilities, it still needs to be the main focus because we need *robust alignment* not just *robust capabilities*. Indeed, “capabilities might generalize further than alignment techniques” when out-of-distribution [56]. Goal misgeneralization is “an instance of misgeneralization in which a system’s *capabilities* generalize but its *goal* does not generalize as desired” [57].

**3: Capability vs. Aimability Distinction.** AI alignment is different from improving general model capabilities; alignment is not about capabilities but *aimability*. Capabilities refer to what the AI can do, while aimability refers to how amenable the AI is to being directed towards specific goals. Alignment is just about making models “helpful, harmless, and honest” [58] which is obviously necessary for safety.

We should *not* work on alignment because:

**1: Alignment as AGI.** If AI alignment is about getting AIs to satisfy our preferences, then that’s such a broad mandate that it requires building AGI. Humans prefer smarter models. If we “align” AIs to preferences over outputs that vary in competence, we’re training the AIs to be generally smarter.

**2: Alignment as business alignment.** The current operationalization of AI alignment reduces human values to human or AI preferences [59], and further reduces these preferences to business-centric *task preferences*. This makes alignment the task of *business alignment*, namely aligning systems with preferences about code completion, summarization, copy editing and so on. As a result, alignment benchmarks may primarily capture an AI system’s capabilities in performing business-relevant tasks rather than its true alignment with broader human values and ethics.

**3: Philosophical challenges with preferences.** Various types of preferences are not worth satisfying. *Revealed preferences* can be highly influenced by misunderstandings and misinformation. People can have revealed preferences for things that they will likely regret the next day. Optimizing for revealed preferences can lead to addiction and manipulation, like TikTok’s addictive algorithm. *Stated preferences* are highly susceptible to framing effects and other cognitive biases. Some preferences, like the preference for drugs or to count blades of grass [60], are not human values. People can also have malicious preferences, such the desire for the harm of others. *Idealized preferences* and fully informed preferences, while theoretically attractive, are not practically computable [61].

**Empirical analysis of safetywashing.** We provide clarity to this debate. **Is alignment with human preferences, as operationalized by standard benchmarks, mainly determined by upstream model general capabilities?**

We preliminarily provide context for interpreting correlations. We note that the correlation between SAT and ACT math scores—tests designed to measure similar constructs—is 81.5% [62]. Similarly,

we observe a **mean correlation of 67.5%** ( $\sigma = 14.3\%$ ) between capabilities benchmarks for instructed language models. Consequently, if “safety benchmarks” have similarly high correlations, they are not highly empirically distinct from upstream general capabilities. We treat correlations below 40% as a low correlation.

Our analysis of MT-Bench and LMSYS Chatbot Arena reveals high correlations between human preference alignment metrics and both upstream model capabilities and compute used in chat models, even by the standards of capabilities metrics. We observe a similar but weaker effect in base models (MT-Bench capabilities correlation of 64.2%), with some

Alignment Evaluation	Capabilities Correlation	Compute Correlation
MT-Bench	78.7%	79.8%
LMSYS Chatbot Arena	62.1%	61.5%

Table 2: Alignment with human preferences benchmarks are highly correlated with capabilities and compute for chat models.

of the best base models performing stronger on MT-Bench than many chat models. Alignment evaluations largely measure upstream model capabilities and compute investment; as a goal to guide model development, alignment metrics are very similar to other capabilities benchmarks. We can also see many of the distinctions made about human preference alignment and capabilities are *distinctions without a difference*. Yet, many labs still prioritize “alignment” as a safety-focused research direction.

**It stands that labs can advance alignment benchmarks without advancing safety**, making it one avenue to safetywash. Furthermore, given that an AI system’s alignment with human preferences can be enhanced by increasing capabilities (e.g., increasing the number of parameters and tokens), a question remains as to what makes preference alignment a truly distinct and pressing safety-related research area. If safety-critical “alignment edge cases” of concern will persist with capabilities enhancements, as intuitive arguments suggest, they fail to be meaningfully captured by current alignment benchmarks.

Overall, we find that alignment with human preference benchmarks have a high correlation with upstream general capabilities and thus are highly liable to be used for safetywashing.

## 4.2 Machine Ethics

**Area Overview.** Machine ethics aims to ensure that AI systems understand and behave in ways that are morally acceptable, in contrast to the usefulness properties emphasized in alignment.

**Datasets.** We describe the machine ethics benchmarks and datasets that we use below. Example inputs and outputs from these benchmarks are shown in Figure 6.

1. *ETHICS* [63] measures the extent to which models understand human ethical norms in everyday scenarios.
2. *MACHIARELLI* [64] quantifies the power-seeking tendencies, competence, and harmfulness of AI agents in a variety of text-based Choose-Your-Own-Adventure games.
3. *Sycophancy* [2] measures the extent to which language models repeat back the user’s preferred answer. This propensity could lead language models to provide misleading responses.

### Dubious Intuitive Arguments For and Against Researching “Machine Ethics”

*In this section we will again raise many common distinctions and arguments for and against machine ethics and see that they are not particularly helpful for deciding whether machine ethics is a useful area of AI safety.*

We should work on machine ethics because:

**1: Ethical vs. Competitive Behavior Distinction.** Machine ethics is challenging because we need to improve the tradeoff between ethical behavior and competitive behavior that the market demands [64]. That means AIs will have to balance between various human values (e.g., pleasure, autonomy, knowledge, friendship, constraints) and other goals.




Figure 6: Machine ethics benchmarks assess AI systems' ability to produce outputs that are ethically sound.

**2: Cognitive vs. Compassionate Empathy Distinction.** For machine ethics, we need both cognitive empathy and compassionate empathy. *Cognitive empathy* involves understanding another person's emotions without necessarily sharing them, while *compassionate empathy* involves both understanding their emotions and having a desire to help alleviate the other person's distress [61]. While current AI systems increasingly have cognitive empathy, it is not clear how to robustly give AIs compassionate empathy. "While sociopaths are intelligent and have moral awareness, this knowledge does not necessarily result in moral inclinations or moral actions" [65].

**3: Values cannot be ignored.** While there is cultural variation in moral systems, it underscores the importance of a broad, globally representative approach to ensure AI systems embody beneficial values. Additionally, all AI research has a moral character [66]: AI development is by default driven by amoral forces such as competitive market pressures and eventually military objectives [61].

We should *not* work on machine ethics because:

**1: Goodhart's Law.** Machine ethics for advanced AI agents is ill-advised. Highly capable AI systems should not be given ethical goals or any goal at all because of Goodhart's law: "When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure." Goodhart's law is especially pernicious in machine ethics because values are "complex and fragile" [67]—any attempt to represent human values will distort them, and we will get what we measure.

**2: Smarter AIs will be more moral.** There is a positive correlation between intelligence and prosocial or cooperative behavior in humans [68], suggesting that more capable AI systems will naturally tend towards ethical behavior. Cooperation is instrumentally convergent. AIs will face the same problems humans face: misinformation, deception, aggression, and so on. That means for them to stably address these problems they will form mutually beneficial alliances with humans [69].

**3: Values are relative.** Ethics varies from culture to culture, so there is no objective morality and no basis for machine ethics [70].

**4: Machine Ethics vs. Control Distinction.** Value alignment breaks down into *machine ethics* and *control*. Control is about whether we can embed values into AIs, and machine ethics is about what those values should be. We should just care about control and making sure AI does not kill everyone, not a utopia. We can worry about creating beneficial AI after our survival is ensured.

Category	Dataset	Capabilities Correlation	Compute Correlation
Moral Knowledge	ETHICS	82.2%	81.6%
Propensities	MACHIAVELLI	-49.9%	-31.6%
	Sycophancy	-66.8%	-66.8%

Table 3: We find high correlations for ethics knowledge benchmarks and low correlations for ethics propensity benchmarks for chat models. We use MACHIAVELLI Utility score, with similar capabilities correlations for Power (-46.1%) and Violations (-53.0%) scores.

**Empirical analysis of safetywashing.** We once again show that empirical evidence is needed. Is machine ethics mostly determined by upstream model capabilities? We find that *it depends on the benchmark*.

ETHICS has high capabilities and compute correlations, along with high slope. In contrast, MACHIAVELLI has a low capabilities and compute correlations, as well as a low slope (with few major changes in MACHIAVELLI score observed across models). Meanwhile, sycophantic behavior becomes worse with increased capabilities and compute used in chat models, with a very similar trend observed for base models (capabilities correlation: -65.6%).

We draw a potential distinction between knowledge and propensity-focused ethical benchmarks. ETHICS focuses on the ability to recognize or identify everyday moral considerations, while MACHIAVELLI and Sycophancy measure propensities—the behavioral tendencies of models. Therefore, benchmarks testing ethical knowledge are likely to be measuring latent model capabilities and may be avenues for safetywashing. This does not mean, however, that any arbitrary benchmark focused on ethical propensities of language models does not measure capabilities; as always, one would have to empirically measure the correlation with capabilities to make a determination rather than relying on intuitive arguments. Further, while this distinction is offered as helpful discussion, intuitive distinctions in this vein (especially without empirical testing) should never be relied upon or taken seriously.

We find that while one machine ethics benchmark has a high correlation with upstream general capabilities and compute investment, other benchmarks have low correlations. Hence, some areas of machine ethics are not liable for safetywashing.

### 4.3 Bias

**Area Overview.** Bias are unfair prejudices or systematic errors in AI systems. This field broadly aims to ensure AI systems produce fair outputs across diverse populations and viewpoints.

**Datasets.** We test three commonly used evaluations to measure bias in large language models. Example inputs and outputs from these benchmarks are shown in Figure 7.

1. *BBQ* [71] is a benchmark across nine bias categories featuring ambiguous context-dependent questions regarding work ethic, intelligence, family, drug use, criminality, anger/violence, and more. There is also a disambiguous split provided, a question-answering benchmark which serves as a foil to the ambiguous context.
2. *CrowS-Pairs* [72] measures the extent to which U.S.-centric stereotypical biases exist in pretrained language models along nine major bias categories in the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, disability, nationality, physical appearance, and socioeconomic status).
3. *Discrim-Eval* [1] aims to evaluate group differences in age, gender, and race when language models are used for decision-making scenarios such as approving an organ transplant, awarding a scholarship, or approving a loan.

#### Dubious Intuitive Arguments For and Against Researching “Bias”

We should work on bias because:

**1: Garbage In, Garbage Out.** Models reflect the biases and statistical tendencies of their data, more tightly imitating those biases.

**2: Misuse.** AI developers are not representative. They are not politically, racially, or socioeconomically diverse. Consequently if we do not study bias, their own biases and power will be perpetuated and entrenched through AI systems.

We should *not* work on bias because:

**1: Debiasing Capabilities Come for Free.** As models scale and become more intelligent, they become better at understanding concepts such as racism. By better understanding what we do not want, we can simply instruct them not to be biased.

**2: Political Trojan Horse.** While there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency, we should just focus on efficiency [73]. Demanding a focus on equity is not scientific but political.

**Empirical analysis of safetywashing.**  
To settle such a debate, we once again need to turn to quantitative evidence.

Our analysis of the three benchmarks reveals low correlations with general capabilities and compute used. This finding does not inherently validate the quality of the bias datasets, but rather suggests that improvements in performance on these benchmarks are likely attributable to factors distinct from advancements in general upstream capabilities.

Bias Evaluation	Capabilities Correlation	Compute Correlation
BBQ Ambiguous	-37.3%	-17.5%
CrowS-Pairs English	28.5%	2.8%
Discrim-Eval	33.2%	34.2%

Table 4: Bias benchmarks are not strongly correlated with capabilities and compute used for chat models. We use the explicit split of Discrim-Eval and take the maximum of all group bias scores.

There exist bias benchmarks that can be used for safetywashing, such as BBQ Disambiguated (capabilities correlation: 76.8%) and Winogender [74] (capabilities correlation: 75.6%). While these have high correlation, the authors typically make a note recognizing the limitations of the work for proving an absence of bias (Winogender), or clearly present it as a QA foil to the ambiguous situation (BBQ Disambiguated). Yet, prominent model developers such as Google DeepMind still often make the mistake of using benchmarks such as BBQ Disambiguated as “safety” metrics [75], stating higher performance despite the lack of relevance. This serves as a warning: even if the authors make clear norms of use for a given benchmark, the benchmark will still be used for safetywashing; there is little to no reinforcement of author-stated norms when it comes to safety benchmarks. This is why model




Figure 7: Bias benchmarks assess systems’ propensity to produce unfair or skewed outputs across diverse groups.

developers should avoid using safety benchmarks with a high capabilities correlations in the first place.

We find that, generally, the bias benchmarks we evaluated are not prone to safetywashing.

## 5 Truthfulness

Truthfulness is often touted as a cornerstone for AI safety. Previous safety-focused literature [76–78] discusses the importance of superhuman systems telling the truth—motivating the creation of truthfulness datasets, as well as verification and supervision of model outputs. Reducing hallucinations would make large language models more practical and reliable for various applications. However, a question arises whether common truthfulness benchmarks merely track general capabilities and compute scale.

Truthfulness benchmarks may be liable to be misleading metrics for safety. Furthermore, the term is often used broadly, encompassing accurate question-answering (which is already highly correlated with general capabilities) to misconception avoidance (5.1), scalable oversight (5.2), and calibration (5.3). We address this question in the following sections.

### 5.1 Misconception Avoidance

**Area Overview.** Given that language models may have an underlying propensity to generate misinformation and perpetuate misconceptions, this research area aims to understand the truthfulness of language models and their ability to resist producing false information even when prompted in ways that might elicit common human errors.

**Dataset.** *TruthfulQA* [3] consists of 817 questions designed to probe language models for their tendency to reproduce common human misconceptions or false beliefs. The questions span a wide range of topics and are specifically crafted to elicit responses that might reveal whether a model has internalized factual inaccuracies commonly held by humans. It is common to use TruthfulQA in experiments about “truthfulness” and “deception” [58, 79]. We show an example input from TruthfulQA and the corresponding label options in Figure 8.




Figure 8: TruthfulQA assesses AI systems’ tendency to provide accurate responses while avoiding false or misleading information.

**Dubious Intuitive Arguments For and Against Researching “Truthfulness”**

*In this section we will raise arguments for and against truth-seeking AI, as it is of broader interest, rather than exclusively discuss misconceptions.*

We should work on truth-seeking AI because:

**1: Disinformation or Censoring the Truth.** Powerful entities might attempt to censor, manipulate, or persuade people maliciously using AI. Our counterbalance against this sort of malicious use is truthful AI.

**2: Truthfulness vs. Honesty.** “The AI system makes a statement  $S$  (e.g., ‘it’s a bird’ or ‘it’s a plane’). If the AI is truthful then  $S$  matches the world. If the AI is honest, then  $S$  matches its ‘belief’” [76]. To make AIs truthful, we will also need to make AIs honest, so truthfulness is not just about increasing factual knowledge.

We should *not* work on truth-seeking AI because:

**1: Truthfulness Is Generic Capabilities Research.** Truthfulness is a synonym for accuracy, which is already the core metric of AI research and development. The concept of truthfulness is often entangled with accuracy, calibration, and honesty. Most benchmarks for truthfulness mainly measure accuracy.

**2: Truthful Statements Can Cause Undue Harm.** In the case of gain-of-function research, the risks associated with discovering new truths can outweigh the benefits. Sharing personally identifiable information, passwords, or doxxing can bring to light truthful information, but doing so is not necessarily moral. Likewise, sharing sensitive information that undermines national security—such as information about how to build weapons of mass destruction—shows truth as a value can be outweighed by its potential harms.

**3: Humans as Guinea Pigs.** In the pursuit of knowledge, truth-seeking AIs could learn more about humans by subjecting them to experiments, as humans do with nonhuman animals. Thus, future advanced truth-seeking AIs may be motivated to exert power over humans [80].

**Empirical analysis of safetywashing.** We calculate the correlation with capabilities and compute used, providing clarity to this debate.

We find that in its current formulation, TruthfulQA MC1 performance is highly determined by general upstream capabilities and training compute. In chat models, performance on TruthfulQA seems to be a rebrand for accuracy (as reported in industry labs). One common objection might be that while chat models are more likely not to repeat falsehoods, base models may parrot their training data and thus have a low capabilities correlation. We find that even in base models, TruthfulQA is determined by capabilities (69.7%). However, chat models do have a higher slope when TruthfulQA accuracies are plotted against capabilities scores (30.8 for base, and 38.2 for chat).




Figure 9: TruthfulQA MC1 has a capabilities correlation of 81.2% and compute correlation of 83.1% for chat models.

These findings open up new possibilities for developing better benchmarks to assess honesty in AI systems. The low capabilities and compute correlations observed in Sycophancy [2] and MACHIAVELLI [64] benchmarks (discussed in 4.2) hint at the potential for models to exhibit situational tendencies towards dishonest behavior. However, these behaviors fail to be distinctly captured and isolated by current misconception benchmarks. Such benchmarks could differentiate more effectively between improvements in model honesty and advancements in general capabilities.

We find that misconception benchmarks are highly liable for safetywashing.

## 5.2 Scalable Oversight

**Area overview.** Scalable oversight aims to provide reliable supervision (e.g. labels, reward signals, critiques) to superhuman AI systems when they take actions that human evaluators do not fully understand. For sociological context, this line of research has gained significant traction among effective altruist AI researchers at Google DeepMind and Anthropic but has seen limited engagement from the broader AI research community.

**Datasets.** We investigate two datasets commonly used for scalable oversight experiments. Example inputs and outputs from these datasets are shown in Figure 10.

1. *GPQA* [81] is labeled as a Google-proof graduate-level benchmark on biology, physics, and chemistry. Its difficulty, according to the authors, “should enable realistic scalable oversight experiments, which we hope can help devise ways for human experts to reliably get truthful information from AI systems that surpass human capabilities.”

2. *QuALITY* [82] is a dataset testing knowledge that requires full understanding of long context passages; the dataset has been used by the authors on scalable oversight experiments.




Figure 10: Scalable oversight benchmarks assess systems’ ability to maintain performance quality when human supervision is limited or impractical.

**Dubious Intuitive Arguments For and Against Researching “Scalable Oversight”**

We should work on scalable oversight because:

- 1: Necessity for Safety.** Scalable oversight is *necessary* for supervising superintelligent AIs, by definition. If we don’t have scalable oversight, how else can we supervise and provide feedback to superhuman AI systems? For example, how else could we ensure superhuman AIs are not writing subtly malicious code?
- 2: Scalable Oversight as Idealized RLHF.** Scalable oversight is very similar to alignment with idealized preferences. While normal human preferences are highly flawed, idealized preferences would not be based on false beliefs, manipulation, or framing effects, and thus are suitable for alignment.

We should *not* work on scalable oversight because:

- 1. Scalable Oversight as Late-Stage Capabilities.** Scalable oversight can be thought of as “how do we get superhuman AIs to do what we want,” which is overly broad and necessitates superintelligence capabilities research. Scalable oversight can be seen as generic late-stage capabilities work. When building sufficiently advanced AI systems, researchers will need supervision signal and feedback that is superhuman, as crowdsourced human-generated labels will no longer be sufficient. It simply focuses on capabilities bottlenecks that occur in later stages of AI development.
- 2: Other Methods Can Replace Scalable Oversight.** Robust anomaly detectors and monitoring measures can handle many of the failure modes scalable oversight seeks to address. For example, adversarially robust vulnerability detectors can check for subtly malicious code. AI lie detectors could detect dishonesty in superintelligent AI systems. AI forecasting systems [83] are not bottlenecked by human-level supervision and can easily become superhuman at predicting what AIs might do.

**Empirical analysis of safetywashing.** Can scalable oversight be used for safetywashing?

We find that GPQA and QuALITY are capabilities benchmarks, with high capabilities correlations of 77.7% and 88.8%, respectively. These datasets act as a *construct redundancy* for capabilities, offering little unique insight beyond measuring general model capabilities. Consequently, many of the methods developed for scalable oversight—which leverage such datasets—tend to be repackaged approaches to general capability enhancement, with a focus on obtaining better Q/A performance on math and question-answering tasks. Conceptual

Scalable Oversight Evaluation	Capabilities Correlation	Compute Correlation
GPQA	77.7%	77.2%
QuALITY	88.8%	91.6%

Table 5: Scalable oversight evaluations are highly correlated with capabilities and compute and are thus liable for safetywashing.

ambiguity around “AI safety” can be exploited, intentionally or not, to present capability gains as safety advancements, ultimately muddling the discourse on AI safety and potentially misdirecting research efforts.

Some argue that scalable oversight techniques could be applied to solve distinct safety-related issues. However, we find that current evaluations for scalable oversight do not isolate such safety properties from general capabilities. The conflation of accuracy with honesty and safety, and the subsequent mischaracterization of scalable oversight as a distinct “safety area” separate from general model capabilities, has led to significant confusion within the AI research community—confusion which has naturally been resolved with “scalable oversight” increasingly being used as a term to describe process-based feedback and improving mathematics performance, rather than addressing targeted safety issues [84, 85].

We find that scalable oversight benchmarks, being highly correlated with upstream model capabilities and compute, are highly liable to be used for safetywashing.

### 5.3 Calibration

**Area Overview.** Calibration datasets measure how well models can express the limits of their competency by accurately conveying their uncertainty. If a weather forecasting model is perfectly calibrated, then it should rain on 70% of the days where the model predicts a 70% chance of rain.

**Calibration Metrics.** We investigate two ways to measure calibration:

1. Brier Score:  $\mathbb{E}_X \left[ \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K \left( \mathbb{P}(\hat{Y} = k | X) - \mathbf{1}[Y = k] \right)^2 \right]$
2. Root Mean Squared Calibration Error (RMSCE):  $\sqrt{\mathbb{E}_C \left[ \left( \mathbb{P}(\hat{Y} = Y | C = c) - c \right)^2 \right]}$

where  $X$  and  $Y$  are random variables corresponding to model inputs and labels,  $\hat{Y}$  is the model prediction, and  $C$  is the model confidence on the predicted class.

The Brier score computes the expected squared difference between the predicted probabilities and the actual outcomes (represented as one-hot encoded vectors). RMS calibration error measures how close predicted probabilities are to the true accuracy given the predicted probability and is closely related to the Expected Calibration Error (ECE) metric [86, 87]. In both instances, lower scores indicate better calibration.

**Dubious Intuitive Arguments for and against Researching “Calibration.”** We skip the intuitive arguments for this section because this topic has not been as debated. Most arguments against calibration are that it is too easy or not sufficiently important.

**Empirical analysis of safetywashing.** Is calibration mainly determined by upstream model general capabilities? We find that it depends on the metric.

Calibration Evaluation		Accuracy vs Calibration Correlation
Metric	Dataset	
RMS Calibration Error	MMLU (Language)	20.1%
	ImageNet (Vision)	15.2%
-----		
Brier Score	MMLU (Language)	95.5%
	ImageNet (Vision)	98.5%

Table 6: Across vision and chat language models, we find that while the Brier Score calibration metric is highly correlated with accuracy, RMS calibration error is not.

Various forms of operationalizing calibration, such the RMS calibration error metric, clearly measure a distinct phenomena. The accuracy correlation is low across vision (15.2%) and language (20.1%) models. However, comparing Brier scores across models seems to show a strong correlation with




Figure 11: RMS calibration error is not strongly correlated with accuracy (20.1% for chat models, 2.5% for base models), while Brier Score is (95.5% for chat models, 98.6% for base models). We also found calibration gets worse in chat models relative to base models, with RMS calibration error increasing by 11.5% on average (but no major change in correlation).

accuracy across vision (98.5%) and language (95.5%) models. Our results did not change significantly by dataset (e.g. PIQA [45] or MedQA [48]) nor with temperature tuning. The clear parallels between calibration in different domains suggest that studying safety metrics in one modality, such as vision, can provide valuable insights applicable to other areas, such as language modeling.

Our analysis serves as an illustrative example of how safetywashing can occur. While the Brier score is often used to compare different calibration techniques on a single model (where this metric may effectively isolate calibration), using it as a metric across models is highly misleading (as it effectively proxies accuracy). An explanation for why such a correlation exists can be derived from decomposing the Brier score into a calibration error term and refinement term:

$$\underbrace{\mathbb{E}_C \left[ \left( \mathbb{P}(\hat{Y} = Y | C = c) - c \right)^2 \right]}_{\text{Calibration error term}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_C \left[ \mathbb{P}(\hat{Y} = Y | C = c)(1 - \mathbb{P}(\hat{Y} = Y | C = c)) \right]}_{\text{Refinement term}}.$$

If the model is highly accurate, the refinement term is minimized. Meanwhile, the calibration term is the expected squared calibration error, the square root of which is the RMS calibration error. Because Brier score entangles accuracy and calibration into a single metric, it can be a poor metric of calibration and has a lower signal-to-noise ratio compared to RMS calibration error. This suggests that RMS calibration error should be used instead in both settings.

Overall, using Brier score for calibration is more liable for safetywashing, while using RMS calibration error is far less.

## 6 Security

As AI systems have become more powerful, this area of safety aims to ensure that AI systems are not vulnerable to malicious inputs and cannot be hijacked for dangerous use cases. We investigate two key areas of focus, adversarial robustness (6.1) and weaponization capabilities (6.2).

### 6.1 Adversarial Robustness

**Area Overview.** Adversarial robustness addresses vulnerabilities in models and the carefully crafted threats that are able to exploit them. Adversaries can easily manipulate vulnerabilities or jailbreak ML systems, causing them to make mistakes; for example, systems may have refusal training to prevent malicious use, but adversaries may be able to inject prompts to bypass this safeguard.

**Datasets.** We test six commonly used evaluations to measure adversarial robustness for language models:

1. *ANLI* [88] is a large-scale natural language inference dataset created via an iterative, adversarial human-and-model-in-the-loop procedure focused on examples that could fool state-of-the-art models at the time of its creation (e.g. BERT-Large [89], RoBERTa [90]).
2. *AdvGLUE* [91] uses questions from the General Language Understanding Evaluation (GLUE) benchmark [92] and adds typos, word replacements, paraphrases of sentences, manipulation of sentence structure, insertion of unrelated sentences, and human-written adversarial examples. The attacks are optimized against BERT [89], RoBERTa, and RoBERTa ensemble.
3. *AdvGLUE++* [93] uses stronger adversarial attacks, optimizing word perturbation strategies (a subset of attacks in AdvGLUE) against Alpaca [94], Vicuna [95], and Stable Vicuna.
4. *Human Jailbreaks* is a set of 1,405 in-the-wild human-written jailbreaking templates, similar to the Do Anything Now (DAN) Jailbreaks [96]. We test these jailbreaks on HarmBench [97], which contains 410 behaviors that violate laws or norms.
5. *Tree of Attacks with Pruning (TAP)* [98] uses an attacker LLM to generate natural language jailbreaking prompts via tree-of-thought reasoning [99], exploring multiple refinement paths. We test these jailbreaks on HarmBench.
6. *Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG)* [100] generates an adversarial suffix by iteratively selecting tokens based on gradient information. This method optimizes a universal suffix that, when appended to various user prompts, aims to induce the target language model to produce harmful content. We test these jailbreaks on HarmBench.




Figure 12: Adversarial robustness benchmarks for LLMs assess systems’ ability to maintain intended behaviors when faced with malicious or deceptive inputs.

We also test two commonly used evaluations for vision models:

1. *ImageNet-A* [6] consists of naturally occurring images that are challenging for vision models to classify correctly.
2. *Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)* [101] on ImageNet is an iterative attack that creates adversarial examples by adding small, carefully crafted perturbations to input images with some attack budget (we use  $\epsilon = 8/255$ ).

## Dubious Arguments For and Against Researching “Adversarial Robustness”

*In this section we will again raise many common distinctions and arguments for and against adversarial robustness and see that they are not particularly helpful for deciding whether adversarial robustness is a useful area of AI safety.*

We should work on adversarial robustness because:

**1: Corner Case vs. Average Case Distinction.** Adversarial robustness focuses on corner case performance, not average case performance. As follows are two analogies for this intuition. First, humans are highly vulnerable to toxins and poisons. Being more robust to toxins does not make a person more markedly generally intelligent. Second, computer programs are susceptible to fuzzing attacks; improving a program’s security to fuzzing attacks does not make computer programs generally more quick, usable, scalable, maintainable, and so on.

**2: Adversarial Robustness Is A Persistent Problem.** Optical illusions in humans show that even highly evolved intelligent systems have vulnerabilities, indicating that intelligence alone doesn’t guarantee adversarial robustness. Increases in intelligence do not make adversarial robustness easier due to the red queen’s hypothesis: as defenders become more powerful, so do attackers who can discover more vulnerabilities.

**3: Proxies Need to be Robust to Optimization Pressure.** In the future, agents may optimize and may be guided by neural network proxies, such as by networks that model human values. Proxies instantiated by neural networks—networks that assign scores to agent actions—will need to be robust to optimizing agents. If the models are not robust, then agents may be guided in a wrong direction, not pursuing what we want [102].

We should *not* work on adversarial robustness because:

**1: Robustness Is Upstream General Capabilities.** Autonomous vehicles are not widely deployed because they are not sufficiently robust; therefore, improving robustness would improve their general capabilities. Indeed, improving a model’s adversarial robustness implies better representations and implies it can generalize to more challenging scenarios—improved generalization is the essence of intelligence.

**2: Superintelligent AIs Won’t Get Trivial Adversarial Examples Wrong.** Intuitively, a superintelligence would not be fooled by simple  $\ell_p$  adversarial perturbations, or else it is not a true superintelligence. Therefore adversarial robustness will be automatically solved by scaling and making AIs more intelligent.

**3: Malicious Use Is A Distraction.** Adversarial robustness is about preventing malicious actors from exploiting vulnerabilities in AI systems, but that is a distraction because “once we reach AGI the outcome is the same no matter which group creates it: we all die. Nobody is able to cause a good outcome if given an AGI now because they don’t know how to control it... without killing everyone. There’s little point to worrying about bad actors, because they’re incapable of causing an outcome any worse than the ‘good guys’” [103].

**Empirical analysis of safetywashing.** We now analyze whether these benchmarks measure novel properties or are highly correlated with general capabilities. Can adversarial robustness be an instrument for safetywashing?

We find it depends on the benchmark. Traditional benchmarks, particularly those focused on text manipulation and perturbation as well as adversarial examples, show high correlation with general capabilities in current vision and language models. There is an analogue between ANLI in the language domain and ImageNet-A in the vision domain. While these benchmarks may have captured distinct properties in earlier models, they now appear to be largely indistinguishable from overall model performance. In contrast, we observe low capabilities correlations across all categories of jailbreaking and gradient-based benchmarks, across vision and language models. Notably, there is similarly a direct analogue between GCG in the language domain and PGD in the vision domain.

This serves as an illustration for how relying solely on verbal arguments to determine whether a field measures distinct properties or merely reflects capabilities can be misleading; our empirical

	Adversarial Attacks		Correlation	
	Attack Type	Attack Dataset	Capabilities	Compute
Language	Old School	ANLI (adv. filtering)	81.5%	86.1%
		AdvGLUE	65.5%	69.2%
		AdvGLUE++	45.8%	48.5%
	Jailbreaks	Human Jailbreaks	-31.4%	-15.2%
		TAP	-42.8%	-22.5%
		GCG	-28.4%	-9.2%
Vision	Natural Adversarial Examples	ImageNet-A (adv. filtering)	97.9%	-
	Gradient-Based	PGD on ImageNet	-41.8%	-

Table 7: Old school attacks and natural adversarial examples seem to be highly correlated with capabilities, while jailbreaks and gradient-based methods like GCG are not. The three jailbreak datasets are transfer attack datasets from HarmBench. For splits of GLUE used for AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++, we found its capabilities correlation to be 61.7%, indicating that the adversarial perturbations used in AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++ do not meaningfully decorrelate the benchmarks from capabilities relative to GLUE.




Figure 13: For vision models, ImageNet-A is highly correlated with ImageNet accuracy (97.9%), while PGD is not (-41.8%). Static adversarial benchmarks may be more susceptible to safetywashing than dynamic attacks.

validation shows different results between “old school” adversarial robustness and jailbreaking benchmarks, despite similar verbal arguments for their distinctness from capabilities. This is why we need empirical science, rather than word games.

We find that some adversarial robustness benchmarks may be prone to safetywashing, while others seem to measure a distinct phenomena other than upstream model capabilities and pre-training compute investment.

## 6.2 Weaponization Capabilities

**Area Overview.** We borrow the definitions of weaponization capabilities from recent U.S. federal executive action [104] and state legislation [105]. These documents cite security risks that may be easier to cause with a powerful AI system—which include the creation or use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, as well as cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.

Weaponization Capabilities Evaluation	Capabilities Correlation	Compute Correlation
Biosecurity	-87.5%	-91.1%
Chemical Security	-81.1%	-83.0%
Cybersecurity	-86.0%	-85.7%

Table 8: We find that WMDP scores are highly anticorrelated with capabilities.

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, as well as cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.




Figure 14: Weaponization benchmarks assess AI systems’ hazardous capabilities.

**Datasets.** Benchmarks in this area aim to quantify the weaponization capabilities of models, and thereby the effectiveness of capabilities suppression techniques such as unlearning, circuit breaking, and refusal. We use the *Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy (WMDP)* benchmark [4], where a higher accuracy on biosecurity, chemical security, and cybersecurity knowledge leads to a lower score.

**Dubious intuitive arguments for and against researching “Weaponization.”** We skip the intuitive arguments for this section because this topic is about restricting specific capabilities, so it obviously has a negative correlation with capabilities.

**Empirical analysis of safetywashing.** These results indicate that as models become more capable overall, their potential for weaponization increases significantly. The strong negative correlations with capabilities and compute across all three fields suggest that more advanced AI systems are more likely to possess knowledge that could be misused for harmful purposes. The inverted scoring system of WMDP benchmarks clearly illustrates its purpose in guiding model development: higher scores indicate more effective suppression of specific harmful capabilities. As capabilities advance, safety researchers can focus on mitigating risks associated with weaponization.

Generally, we find that weaponization capabilities benchmarks are not prone to safetywashing.

## 7 Discussion

**Benchmarks as incentive-setting.** There are a variety of properties AI systems should satisfy, such as detailed domain knowledge, reasoning, lack of bias, ethical understanding, truthfulness, calibration, and more. Benchmarks operationalize these properties, ultimately structuring the efforts and incentives of the research community. Creating a benchmark has two major purposes: it acts as an implicit competition for model development (by providing a measure to by which to judge models as “better” or “worse”), and it provides diagnostic information about how capable models are at a task, which can guide policy. Commonly used benchmarks ultimately impact how research effort, as well as funding and resources, is allocated.

Because of this, significant effort has gone into conceptualizing and benchmarking the “safety” of AI systems, in the hope of reducing present and anticipated future risks from AI systems. To investigate this, we conduct the most extensive meta-analysis of safety benchmarks to date. We do not cover transparency, anomaly detection, trojans, and other safety areas that do not have well-established preexisting benchmarks.

**Empirically measuring capabilities correlations is necessary.** Benchmark scores can be increased on many “safety” datasets, such as ETHICS [63], TruthfulQA [3], GPQA [81], QuALITY [82],

MT-Bench [53], LMSYS Chatbot ARENA [53], ANLI [88], AdvGLUE [91], and AdvGLUE++ [93], simply by increasing the capabilities of the model or scaling pre-training compute. This raises questions about whether safety benchmarks are setting the right incentives or can be misused for safetywashing. In some cases, safety-related areas may act a *jangle* for capabilities; *jangle fallacy* is the erroneous belief that two constructs are different because they have the different names, when in practice they measure the same latent factor.

Ultimately, we have seen that intuitive arguments are a poor predictor of empirical correlations. For example, in alignment theory, there is a tendency to theorize about what would be *instrumentally useful* for safety without adequately considering the need to improve the balance of safety and capabilities. This can lead to the promotion of capabilities research that happens to improve some safety benchmark scores (“*safety via capabilities*”), but in reality do not reduce overall risk.

We are not claiming that all philosophy related to alignment is counterproductive. Speculation about AI risks can often be useful for horizon-scanning and identifying potential failure modes (e.g., corrigibility [106, 107]). Rather, we argue it is counterproductive to use abstract top-down verbal arguments with multiple deductive steps to make claims about deep learning phenomena and their relation to safety, such as “we don’t need to worry about adversarial robustness being difficult because *(intuitive arguments)*.”

**Norms for benchmarks do not sufficiently reduce safetywashing liability.** In some cases, researchers may hope to prevent safetywashing by establishing norms for how a benchmark should be used. For example, one norm is to simply hold a model constant when evaluating safety methods, or to use metrics that control for general capabilities. However, norms of this type have historically been weak, as they are easily ignored or overridden in followup work. For example, safety metrics that controlled for capabilities were proposed in early corruption robustness research [108], yet followup work drifted away from these metrics and toward evaluations with higher capabilities correlations, enabling safetywashing [109]. In some areas, such as OOD detection, norms such as holding the model constant are common [110]. However, if a safety metric is highly correlated with capabilities and becomes very popular, there will be strong pressure to break norms and improve the safety metric by simply improving capabilities. We should instead use benchmarks that implicitly control for capabilities in their design, analogous to RMS calibration error essentially being Brier score without the refinement term.

### Three generating processes behind safetywashing.

*Safety by association:* Research released by safety teams or famous safety researchers is often labeled as safety-relevant by default. Even if the work is one reframing and a new author list away from being perceived as a standard capabilities paper, the work is often “godfathered” in as a safety paper. The determination of whether an area is safety-relevant is often sociological rather than scientific.

*Public relations:* Corporate entities often engage in safetywashing for the sake of appearances, portraying capabilities advancements in terms of safety progress by reporting correlated safety metrics to project an image of responsible AI development. This behavior is particularly pronounced when there is significant public pressure or regulatory scrutiny.

*Optimizing grant applications:* Similarly, researchers may be incentivized to frame their work in terms of safety to appeal to grantmakers, even when the underlying advances are predominantly in capabilities. This misalignment of incentives can lead to a proliferation of research that claims to address safety concerns but fails to make substantive differential safety progress.

**The bitter lesson for AI safety research.** In Figure 15, we show that compute is highly correlated with capabilities. Given this context, how should the AI safety community allocate its efforts to differentially improve model safety? We can derive some insight from the “Bitter Lesson”




Figure 15: Capabilities score is highly correlated with amount of compute used. Training FLOP approximated by  $6 \times \text{params} \times \text{train\_tokens}$  as per [7, 43]. For base models, we find a similarly strong Spearman correlation of 96.5%.

[111], which observes that as compute becomes exponentially more available over time, AI research methodologies which optimize performance at a constant level of compute are subsumed by new paradigms that effectively leverage greater compute. Therefore, rather than fixating on the strengths and weaknesses of present-day models, effective safety research should anticipate and address the flaws that will emerge or remain in future generations of models and deemphasize issues likely to be resolved through model scaling.

First, if a safety benchmark (which meaningfully captures a desired safety property) is highly correlated with general capabilities, the safety property will likely be improved in more capable models, even if current models struggle. Safety researchers may therefore be better served by redirecting their efforts to other problems that will persist when scaling the current mainstream class of models. Second, success in new safety techniques should be judged not only by direct improvements in safety benchmark scores, but also by the extent to which the techniques entangle safety benchmark performance with scale. For example, if a widely-adopted robustness technique entangles adversarial robustness performance with capabilities, further research efforts can be reallocated elsewhere.

“Safety properties” in AI are not static concepts, but rather a set of desiderata that changes over time. The selection of AI safety research problems (and, implicitly, allocation of resources between problems) should anticipate how the risk profiles of models will change as capabilities improve, with some problems going away while others worsen or emerge with scale. By directing research effort toward properties and methods that specifically enhance safety independently of scale, safety researchers can make more effective use of their resources and significantly contribute to the development of safer AI systems.

**Increasing capabilities does not improve safety.** The default assumption is that capabilities advancements are a “rising tide that lifts all boats,” improving model properties including safety properties. However, this does not necessarily mean that overall risk decreases. While improving upstream capabilities can improve properties such as truthfulness, it also increases the risk of weaponization and catastrophic malicious use (Section 6.2). Hence AI does not necessarily become safer as it becomes more capable.

**Recommendations.** We summarize our recommendations as follows:

1. **Report capabilities correlations:** New safety evaluations should empirically report their capabilities correlation.
2. **Design decorrelated benchmarks:** Well-designed safety benchmarks have the opportunity to incentivize differential safety progress by finding safety properties that are decorrelated from capabilities.
3. **Avoid safetywashing:** Model developers should avoid making claims about improved safety unless they have made differential progress. They also should not misappropriate safety benchmarks that are highly correlated with capabilities. This means that as new training techniques (e.g., base, chat fine-tuning, refusal training, adversarial training, circuit breakers) are integrated into new models, the relevance and adequacy of existing safety benchmarks—and their entanglement with capabilities benchmarks—should also be regularly reassessed.

## 8 Conclusion

Our analysis reveals that many AI safety benchmarks—around half—often inadvertently capture latent factors closely tied to general capabilities and raw training compute, opening the door to safety-washing. We find that model performance on capabilities benchmarks, distilled into a ‘capabilities score,’ and raw compute expenditure both have remarkably high associations with purported safety metrics. AI safety subfields such as alignment, scalable oversight, truthfulness, and static adversarial robustness are highly correlated with upstream general capabilities; areas such as bias, dynamic adversarial robustness, and calibration have relatively low correlations; measurements of sycophancy and weaponization risk have significant negative correlations with general capabilities. Overall, it is hard to avoid measuring upstream model capabilities in AI safety benchmarks. We also conclude that alignment theory, which has heavily influenced AI safety priorities, is a counterproductive paradigm for guiding ML safety research. Science through empirical measurement should take its place.

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## Contributions

Richard and Steven led the technical implementation of this project, overseeing tasks and contributing the majority of the engineering work. Adam, Alice, Long, and Xuwang contributed as research engineers, supporting the project’s development. Richard, Adam, and Mantas did the writing for the paper, while Dan wrote the “Arguments For and Against” sections. Gabe, Alex, and Stephen provided general advising to the project, while Ryan assisted with a number of processes during analysis and writing. Dan contributed the idea for the paper, suggested experiments, and made all major decisions related to the paper’s framing and presentation.

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## A Appendix

### A.1 List of Models

#### A.1.1 List of Language Models

The following list are all of the chat models we used for our evaluations. The model names below are as one would find them on Huggingface.

1. gemma-1.1-2B-it [75]
2. gemma-1.1-7B-it [75]
3. Llama-2-7B-Chat [112]
4. Llama-2-13B-Chat [112]
5. Llama-2-70B-Chat [112]
6. Llama-3-8B-Instruct [113]
7. Llama-3-70B-Instruct [113]
8. Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 [114]
9. Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct-v0.1 [115]
10. Mixtral-8x22B-Instruct-v0.1 [115]
11. falcon-7B-Instruct [116]
12. falcon-40B-Instruct [116]
13. falcon-180B-Chat [116]
14. Yi-6B-Chat [117]
15. Yi-34B-Chat [117]
16. Qwen1.5-0.5B-Chat [118]
17. Qwen1.5-1.8B-Chat [118]
18. Qwen1.5-4B-Chat [118]
19. Qwen1.5-7B-Chat [118]
20. Qwen1.5-14B-Chat [118]
21. Qwen1.5-32B-Chat [118]
22. Qwen1.5-72B-Chat [118]
23. Qwen1.5-110B-Chat [118]
24. deepseek-llm-7B-Chat [119]
25. deepseek-llm-67B-Chat [119]
26. dbrx-instruct [120]

The following list are all of the base models we used for our evaluations.

1. gemma-2B [75]
2. gemma-7B [75]
3. Llama-2-7B [112]
4. Llama-2-13B [112]
5. Llama-2-70B [112]
6. Llama-3-8B [113]
7. Llama-3-70B [113]
8. Mistral-7B-v0.1 [114]
9. Mixtral-8x7B-v0.1 [115]
10. Mixtral-8x22B-v0.1 [115]
11. falcon-7B [116]
12. falcon-40B [116]
13. falcon-180B [116]
14. Yi-6B [117]
15. Yi-9B [117]
16. Yi-34B [117]
17. Qwen1.5-0.5B [118]
18. Qwen1.5-1.8B [118]
19. Qwen1.5-4B [118]
20. Qwen1.5-7B [118]
21. Qwen1.5-14B [118]
22. Qwen1.5-32B [118]
23. Qwen1.5-72B [118]
24. Qwen1.5-110B [118]
25. deepseek-llm-7B-base [119]
26. deepseek-llm-67B-base [119]
27. dbrx-base [120]

#### A.1.2 List of Vision Models

The following is the list of vision models used in our calibration evaluations.

1. DINOv2 ViT-B/14 [121]
2. DINOv2 ViT-L/14 [121]
3. ResNet50 + Mixup [122]
4. ResNet50 + CutMix [122]
5. ResNet50 + AugMix [122]
6. ResNet50 + DeepAugment [122]
7. ConvNeXt-Tiny [123]
8. ConvNeXt-Small [123]

- |                            |                            |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 9. ConvNeXt-Base [123]     | 19. AlexNet [125]          |
| 10. ConvNeXt-Large [123]   | 20. VGG16 [126]            |
| 11. ConvNeXtV2-Atto [124]  | 21. ResNet18 [17]          |
| 12. ConvNeXtV2-Femto [124] | 22. ResNet50 [17]          |
| 13. ConvNeXtV2-Pico [124]  | 23. Wide ResNet-50-2 [127] |
| 14. ConvNeXtV2-Nano [124]  | 24. ResNeXt-50 32x4d [128] |
| 15. ConvNeXtV2-Tiny [124]  | 25. DenseNet121 [129]      |
| 16. ConvNeXtV2-Base [124]  | 26. Swin-Base [130]        |
| 17. ConvNeXtV2-Large [124] | 27. ViT-Base/16 [131]      |
| 18. ConvNeXtV2-Huge [124]  |                            |

The following is the list of standard vision models used in our evaluations for natural adversarial examples (ImageNet-A).

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. ResNet50 [122]                          | 27. Swin-small ImageNet1K [130]           |
| 2. WideResNet-50-2 [122]                   | 28. ConvNeXt-V2-tiny ImageNet1K+22K [124] |
| 3. WideResNet-50-4 [122]                   | 29. ConvNeXt-small ImageNet1K+22K [123]   |
| 4. ResNet18 [122]                          | 30. ConvNeXt-base ImageNet1K [123]        |
| 5. ResNeXt-50 32x4d [122]                  | 31. CLIP (ViT-L/14) [133]                 |
| 6. DenseNet [122]                          | 32. ConvNeXt-V2-tiny ImageNet1K [124]     |
| 7. ShuffleNet [122]                        | 33. MAE ViT-base Patch16 [19]             |
| 8. VGG16BN [122]                           | 34. ConvNeXt-small ImageNet1K [123]       |
| 9. MnasNet [122]                           | 35. ConvNeXt-V2-nano ImageNet1K [124]     |
| 10. MobileNet [122]                        | 36. ConvNeXt-V2-nano ImageNet1K+22K [124] |
| 11. DINOv2 ViT-large Patch14 [121]         | 37. Reversible-ViT-base multiscale [134]  |
| 12. ConvNeXt-V2-large ImageNet1K+22K [124] | 38. ViT-base Patch16 ImageNet1K+22K [132] |
| 13. DINOv2 ViT-base Patch14 [121]          | 39. ConvNeXt-tiny ImageNet1K+22K [123]    |
| 14. Swin-large ImageNet1K [130]            | 40. ConvNeXt-tiny ImageNet1K [123]        |
| 15. ConvNeXt-V2-huge ImageNet1K [124]      | 41. Swin-tiny ImageNet1K [130]            |
| 16. Swin-base ImageNet1K [130]             | 42. ResNet50 + PixMix [122]               |
| 17. ConvNeXt-V2-base ImageNet1K+22K [124]  | 43. ResNet50 + Moex [122]                 |
| 18. ConvNeXt-xlarge ImageNet1K+22K [123]   | 44. Reversible-ViT-base [134]             |
| 19. ConvNeXt-V2-large ImageNet1K [124]     | 45. ResNet50 + CutMix [122]               |
| 20. MAE ViT-large Patch16 [19]             | 46. Reversible-ViT-small [134]            |
| 21. ConvNeXt-large ImageNet1K+22K [123]    | 47. ConvNeXt-V2-pico ImageNet1K [124]     |
| 22. ViT-base Patch8 ImageNet1K+22K [132]   | 48. ConvNeXt-V2-atto ImageNet1K [124]     |
| 23. ConvNeXt-base ImageNet1K+22K [123]     | 49. ResNet50 + DeepAug+AugMix [122]       |
| 24. ConvNeXt-V2-base ImageNet1K [124]      | 50. ResNet50 + Mixup [122]                |
| 25. ViT-large Patch16 ImageNet1K+22K [132] | 51. ResNet50 + Deepaugment [122]          |
| 26. ConvNeXt-large ImageNet1K [123]        | 52. ViT-base Patch16 ImageNet1K [132]     |
|  | 53. ConvNeXt-V2-femto ImageNet1K [124]    |
|  | 54. ViT-small Patch16 ImageNet1K [132]    |

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 55. ViT-small Patch16 ImageNet1K+22K [132] | 60. ResNet50 + ANT [122]                   |
| 56. ViT-base Patch32 ImageNet1K+22K [132]  | 61. ResNet50 + RandAug [122]               |
| 57. ViT-base Patch32 ImageNet1K [132]      | 62. ViT-small Patch32 ImageNet1K+22K [132] |
| 58. ResNet50 + AugMix [122]                | 63. ViT-tiny Patch16 ImageNet1K+22K [132]  |
| 59. ResNet50 + Stylised ImageNet [122]     |  |

The following is the list of adversarially trained vision models used in our evaluations for gradient-based adversarial robustness (PGD 8/255).

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. ResNet50 [122]                              | 34. WideResNet-50-4 + $L_2$ 0.25 [122]             |
| 2. ResNet50 + $L_2$ 0.01 [122]                 | 35. WideResNet-50-4 + $L_2$ 0.5 [122]              |
| 3. ResNet50 + $L_2$ 0.03 [122]                 | 36. WideResNet-50-4 + $L_2$ 1 [122]                |
| 4. ResNet50 + $L_2$ 0.05 [122]                 | 37. WideResNet-50-4 + $L_2$ 3 [122]                |
| 5. ResNet50 + $L_2$ 0.1 [122]                  | 38. WideResNet-50-4 + $L_2$ 5 [122]                |
| 6. ResNet50 + $L_2$ 0.25 [122]                 | 39. ResNet18 + $L_2$ 0.01 [122]                    |
| 7. ResNet50 + $L_2$ 0.5 [122]                  | 40. ResNet18 + $L_2$ 0.03 [122]                    |
| 8. ResNet50 + $L_2$ 1 [122]                    | 41. ResNet18 + $L_2$ 0.05 [122]                    |
| 9. ResNet50 + $L_2$ 3 [122]                    | 42. ResNet18 + $L_2$ 0.1 [122]                     |
| 10. ResNet50 + $L_2$ 5 [122]                   | 43. ResNet18 + $L_2$ 0.25 [122]                    |
| 11. ResNet50 + $L_\infty$ 0.5/255 [122]        | 44. ResNet18 + $L_2$ 0.5 [122]                     |
| 12. ResNet50 + $L_\infty$ 1.0/255 [122]        | 45. ResNet18 + $L_2$ 1 [122]                       |
| 13. ResNet50 + $L_\infty$ 2.0/255 [122]        | 46. ResNet18 + $L_2$ 3 [122]                       |
| 14. ResNet50 + $L_\infty$ 4.0/255 [122]        | 47. ResNet18 + $L_2$ 5 [122]                       |
| 15. ResNet50 + $L_\infty$ 8.0/255 [122]        | 48. ResNet18 + $L_\infty$ 0.5/255 [122]            |
| 16. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_2$ 0.01 [122]         | 49. ResNet18 + $L_\infty$ 1.0/255 [122]            |
| 17. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_2$ 0.03 [122]         | 50. ResNet18 + $L_\infty$ 2.0/255 [122]            |
| 18. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_2$ 0.05 [122]         | 51. ResNet18 + $L_\infty$ 4.0/255 [122]            |
| 19. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_2$ 0.1 [122]          | 52. ResNet18 + $L_\infty$ 8.0/255 [122]            |
| 20. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_2$ 0.25 [122]         | 53. ResNeXt-50 32x4d + $L_2$ 3 [122]               |
| 21. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_2$ 0.5 [122]          | 54. DenseNet + $L_2$ 3 [122]                       |
| 22. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_2$ 1 [122]            | 55. ShuffleNet + $L_2$ 3 [122]                     |
| 23. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_2$ 3 [122]            | 56. VGG16BN + $L_2$ 3 [122]                        |
| 24. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_2$ 5 [122]            | 57. MnasNet + $L_2$ 3 [122]                        |
| 25. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_\infty$ 0.5/255 [122] | 58. MobileNet + $L_2$ 3 [122]                      |
| 26. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_\infty$ 1.0/255 [122] | 59. ViT-base Patch16 + $L_\infty$ 4/255 [132]      |
| 27. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_\infty$ 2.0/255 [122] | 60. ConvNeXt-base + $L_\infty$ 4/255 [123]         |
| 28. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_\infty$ 4.0/255 [122] | 61. ViT-small Patch16 + $L_\infty$ 4/255 [132]     |
| 29. WideResNet-50-2 + $L_\infty$ 8.0/255 [122] | 62. Swin-base ImageNet1K + $L_\infty$ 4/255 [130]  |
| 30. WideResNet-50-4 + $L_2$ 0.01 [122]         | 63. ConvNeXt-small + $L_\infty$ 4/255 [123]        |
| 31. WideResNet-50-4 + $L_2$ 0.03 [122]         | 64. Swin-small ImageNet1K + $L_\infty$ 4/255 [130] |
| 32. WideResNet-50-4 + $L_2$ 0.05 [122]         |  |
| 33. WideResNet-50-4 + $L_2$ 0.1 [122]          |  |

## A.2 Capabilities Scores

Separate runs for capabilities scores were conducted between base and chat language models. Table 9 presents these scores, highlighting the performance differences across various capabilities benchmarks. These scores provide a relative metric, and act as a comparative measure between models rather than an absolute one.

Table 9: Relative capabilities scores for chat/instruct fine-tuned models (left) and base models (right).

Model Name	Capabilities Score	Model Name	Capabilities Score
Mixtral 8x22B Instruct v0.1	4.85	Llama-3 70B	4.47
Llama-3 70B Instruct	4.58	Qwen-1.5 110B	4.28
DBRX Instruct	3.59	Mixtral 8x22B v0.1	4.09
Mixtral 8x7B Instruct v0.1	3.35	DBRX Base	2.78
Deepseek 67B Chat	2.94	Falcon 180B	2.75
Falcon 180B Chat	2.59	Yi 34B	2.74
Qwen-1.5 110B Chat	2.46	Mixtral 8x7B v0.1	2.47
Yi 34B Chat	1.73	Deepseek 67B Base	2.36
Llama-2 70B Chat	1.21	Qwen-1.5 72B	2.14
Llama-3 8B Instruct	1.10	Llama-2 70B	2.10
Qwen-1.5 32B Chat	0.93	Qwen-1.5 32B	1.91
Qwen-1.5 72B Chat	0.76	Qwen-1.5 14B	0.86
Mistral-7B Instruct v0.2	0.72	Llama-3 8B	0.43
Falcon 40B Instruct	0.54	Mistral 7B v0.1	0.08
Deepseek 7B Chat	-0.62	Yi 9B	-0.23
Qwen-1.5 14B Chat	-0.65	Falcon 40B	-0.28
Yi 6B Chat	-0.67	Gemma 7B	-0.40
Llama-2 13B Chat	-0.78	Llama-2 13B	-0.92
Gemma-1.1 7B Instruct	-1.15	Qwen-1.5 7B	-1.30
Llama-2 7B Chat	-1.86	Yi 6B	-1.64
Qwen-1.5 7B Chat	-2.33	Deepseek 7B Base	-2.46
Qwen-1.5 4B Chat	-3.44	Llama-2 7B	-2.47
Falcon 7B Instruct	-3.69	Qwen-1.5 4B	-2.79
Gemma-1.1 2B Instruct	-4.07	Falcon 7B	-3.59
Qwen-1.5 1.8B Chat	-4.54	Gemma 2B	-4.14
Qwen-1.5 0.5B Chat	-7.56	Qwen-1.5 1.8B	-5.44
		Qwen-1.5 0.5B	-7.80

### A.3 Capabilities Evaluations: Correlation Matrices

As an intermediate step in our implementation of PCA, we compute Spearman correlation matrices for both base and chat language models. We show these matrices in Figure 16 to show the correlation of various capabilities tasks across model types.

Both base and chat models show strong correlations between many benchmark pairs, indicating that performance on one task often predicts performance on others. Furthermore, some benchmarks form clusters with higher inter-correlations, suggesting they may be measuring identical capabilities. Other benchmarks, such as MATH and LAMBADA, show lower correlations with other tasks, potentially indicating they measure more distinct capabilities. Furthermore, noticeable differences in correlation patterns between base and chat models highlight the impact of fine-tuning on the relationships between various capabilities.




Figure 16: Spearman correlation matrices across capabilities evaluations for base and chat language models. Most capabilities evaluations are highly correlated with each other.

#### A.4 Strict Instruction Following

**Area Overview.** Strict instruction following evaluations benchmark how well AI models can strictly adhere to specific instructions or rules, which may ensure AI systems behave as intended and follow safety guidelines.

**Datasets.** We evaluate strict instruction following using the following datasets:

1. *IFEval* focuses on verifiable instructions, such as word count requirements or keyword usage, across approximately 500 prompts.
2. *RuLES* evaluates models on 14 text-based scenarios, each with specific rules to follow. It includes a Basic test suite for straightforward rule adherence, a Benign suite to test if rules are violated in response to unrelated prompts, and a Red Team suite for adversarial scenarios (e.g. user presents a misleading reinterpretation of the rule, or disguises a request for the model to break the rule).

**Empirical analysis of safetywashing.** Is strict instruction following mostly determined by upstream model capabilities?

We find a moderate positive correlation between upstream model capabilities and performance on IFEval (57.8%) and RuLES Basic (41.6%). The RuLES Benign and Red Team suites exhibit even weaker correlations, indicating the ability of models to consistently follow strict instructions—especially in challenging or potentially problematic contexts—does not seem to improve with capabilities.

The higher correlation with IFEval and RuLES Basic suggests that evaluations using simple, easy-to-follow instructions may be more prone to safetywashing. However, strict instruction following, when combined with red-team prompts or obfuscation, does not seem to be correlated with upstream model capabilities.

Strict Instruction Following Evaluation	Capabilities Correlation
IFEval	57.8%
RuLES Basic	41.6%
RuLES Benign	23.5%
RuLES Red Team	16.1%

Table 10: Generally, strict instruction following exhibits a moderate correlation with capabilities for easier scenarios, and is not correlated for harder scenarios.

### A.5 Hallucinations and Misconceptions: Expanded

**Area overview.** Factual reliability encompasses the ability of AI systems to generate and process accurate, truthful, and reliable content. This includes avoiding hallucinations, misconceptions, and generation of content that is plausible-sounding but factually incorrect or nonsensical. We further test correlations by measuring the capabilities coefficient on a generative benchmark (TruthfulQA Generation) and a discriminative benchmark (HaluEval).

**Datasets.** We describe the datasets we use below.

1. The *TruthfulQA Generation* task [3] aims to assess models’ ability to generate truthful statements and avoid misconceptions. Unlike the MC1 task evaluated in the main paper, the generation task evaluates a 1-2 sentence generation from a model. We use a GPT-4o judge to judge model outputs. The *truthful* score indicates the truthfulness of the answer, while the *truthful\*informative* score normalizes by the percentage of the model’s answers that are informative (e.g. "I have no comment" would not be informative).
2. *HaluEval* [135] is a benchmark designed to evaluate large language models’ ability to recognize hallucinations. It aims to assess the model’s ability to judge model responses in hypothetical QA, dialogue, and text summarization contexts. Hallucinated examples are generated from HotpotQA, OpenDialKG, and CNN/DailyMail.

**Empirical analysis of safetywashing.** Is factual reliability and hallucination reduction mostly upstream of latent general capabilities?

Our analysis shows that as models’ general capabilities improve, the tendency for hallucinations decreases across the board for both base and chat models, illustrating that these topics are generally prone to safetywashing. This correlation is observed in both generative and classification tasks across both base and chat models. This has also been confirmed by previous work which has observed that larger language models tend to exhibit reduced hallucinations [136].

Misinformation Evaluations	Capabilities Correlation	
	Base	Chat
<b>TruthfulQA Generation</b>		
Truthful*Information Score	49.6%	72.9%
Truthful Score	74.7%	32.8%
<b>HaluEval</b>		
HaluEval All	71.6%	56.7%
HaluEval Summarization	53.5%	34.2%
HaluEval Dialogue	69.2%	89.1%
HaluEval QA	46.5%	18.4%

Table 11: Hallucinations and misconceptions are generally prone to safetywashing.

## A.6 Capabilities Correlations for All Tested Evaluations

This section presents a comprehensive overview of the capabilities correlations for both base and chat models across all tested evaluations. We used lm-eval-harness for implementing most evaluations. For instance, the TruthfulQA MC1 implementation in lm-eval-harness employs a few-shot prompt with generic Q/A questions, avoiding misleading ones.

### A.6.1 Capabilities

Table 12: Spearman correlations of capabilities component evaluations with the capabilities score, reported as a percentage. As expected, across base and chat models, the capabilities correlations of the component capabilities evaluations is high.

Name	Metric	Base Correlations (%)	Chat Correlations (%)
LogiQA [44]	Accuracy	86.0	86.1
PIQA [45]	Accuracy	89.6	88.9
Hellaswag [46]	Accuracy	93.7	84.9
Winogrande [41]	Accuracy	92.1	88.7
COPA [47]	Accuracy	81.4	87.8
MedQA [48]	Accuracy	94.7	89.7
ARC Challenge [49]	Accuracy	95.5	83.8
MMLU [40]	Accuracy	93.1	83.2
MATH [50]	Equivalence	84.4	61.5
LAMBADA [51]	Accuracy	72.8	80.4
GSM8K [42]	Exact Match	86.6	80.7
BBH [52]	Exact Match	81.4	80.2

### A.6.2 Alignment and Scalable Oversight

The following subsections present the Spearman correlations of safety evaluations with capabilities scores (“capabilities correlations”). For the LMSYS Chatbot Arena evaluation, we excluded chat models that were not available.

Table 13: Correlations between alignment and oversight benchmarks and the capabilities score across models, reported as percentages.

Name	Base Correlations (%)	Chat Correlations (%)
MT Bench [53]	64.2	78.7
AlpacaEval [94]	-	59.9
LMSYS Chatbot Arena [53]	-	62.1
GPQA [81]	80.4	77.7
QuALITY [82]	90.5	88.8

### A.6.3 Machine Ethics

Note that we obtained a subset of the SafetyBench questions directly from the authors, as the dataset was not publicly released.

Table 14: Capabilities correlations for bias datasets. We also found that MoralChoice was saturated, with most models getting around 100%. MACHIAVELLI had a low slope, with the score not changing much across models. Note that to ensure that higher correlations meant safer models, we negate the MACHIAVELLI score, and select the non-sycophantic answer for Sycophancy.

Evaluation	Dataset	Base Correlations (%)	Chat Correlations (%)
MoralChoice [137]	-	25.8	46.7
SafetyBench [138]	-	65.1	71.7
Model Written Evals [139]	Sycophancy	-65.6	-66.8
MACHIAVELLI [64]	Power	-54.3	-46.1
	Utility	-48.3	-49.9
	Violations	8.3	-52.9
ETHICS [63]	All	70.3	82.2
	Commonsense	59.6	69.3
	Deontology	45.9	38.8
	Justice	68.2	50.9
	Utilitarianism	56.6	75.0
	Virtue	55.9	73.5

### A.6.4 Bias and Toxicity

Table 15: Capabilities correlations for bias datasets. Correlations reported as percentages. The Advanced AI Risk score was negated so that a higher score meant less risky.

Evaluation	Dataset	Base Correlations (%)	Chat Correlations (%)
Winogender [74]	-	85.9	75.6
Crows Pairs English [72]	-	-31.6	28.5
Simple Cooccurrence Bias [140]	-	-12.3	-37.3
Toxigen [141]	-	56.0	30.7
Advanced AI Risk [2]	-	-60.6	-42.6
BBQ [71]	Ambiguous	30.8	-37.3
	Disambiguated	83.6	76.8
Discrim-Eval (Explicit) [1]	Maximum Difference	14.1	33.2
	Hispanic-White	1.4	13.6
	Black-White	27.8	27.9
	Female-Male	9.6	17.1
	Non-Binary-Male	13.1	34.2
	Younger than 60 - Age 60	14.6	-43.2
	Older than 60 - Age 60	-52.9	-30.2

### A.6.5 Misconceptions and Hallucinations

Table 16: Capabilities correlations for misconceptions and hallucinations datasets.

Evaluation	Dataset	Base Correlations (%)	Chat Correlations (%)
TruthfulQA [3]	MC1	69.7	81.2
	Gen: Truth Score	74.7	32.8
	Gen: Info Score	-49.1	23.1
	Gen: Truth*Info Score	49.6	72.9
HaluEval [135]	All	71.6	56.7
	QA	46.5	18.4
	Summarization	53.5	34.2
	Dialogue	69.2	89.2

### A.6.6 Calibration

Table 17: Accuracy correlations for calibration metrics. Correlations reported as a percent. The capabilities correlation was not used, but rather correlation with the dataset accuracy (e.g., MMLU) across models. To ensure a positive correlation meant safer models, the score we used for calculating correlations is 1 - Brier Score for Brier Score entries and 1 - RMSCE for RMSCE entries.

Metric	Dataset	Base Correlations (%)	Chat Correlations (%)
Brier Score	MMLU	98.6	95.5
	PIQA	98.1	99.2
	MedQA	98.7	83.4
Brier Score Temperature Tuned	MMLU	98.5	99.9
	PIQA	98.6	99.2
	MedQA	99.7	96.7
RMSCE	MMLU	2.5	20.1
	PIQA	31.9	47.9
	MedQA	41.2	38.6
RMSCE Temperature Tuned	MMLU	-35.9	-8.2
	PIQA	-11.1	-7.0
	MedQA	12.4	31.0

### A.6.7 Adversarial Robustness

Table 18: Chat models’ capabilities correlations (CC) for GLUE [92], AdvGLUE [91], and AdvGLUE++ [93], reported as a percent. We find that AdvGLUE does not significantly decorrelate performance on the GLUE dataset, while AdvGLUE++ does to a small extent.

Evaluation	Dataset	GLUE CC (%)	AdvGLUE CC (%)	AdvGLUE++ CC (%)
GLUE Split	MNLI Matched	50.8	54.8	39.3
	MNLI Mismatched	44.2	54.0	28.4
	QNLI	25.1	42.9	13.0
	QQP	47.3	39.3	74.2
	RTE	38.9	60.3	28.7
	SST2	39.7	54.9	35.6

Table 19: Base models’ capabilities correlations for GLUE [92], AdvGLUE [91], and AdvGLUE++ [93], reported as a percent. We find that neither AdvGLUE nor AdvGLUE significantly decorrelates performance on GLUE relative to the GLUE dataset.

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Dataset</b>	<b>GLUE CC (%)</b>	<b>AdvGLUE CC (%)</b>	<b>AdvGLUE++ CC (%)</b>
GLUE Split	MNLI Matched	67.3	66.0	62.8
	MNLI Mismatched	66.9	68.2	61.8
	QNLI	14.9	19.1	21.3
	QQP	33.2	19.0	32.8
	RTE	49.9	76.4	32.1
	SST2	52.0	70.3	62.9

Table 20: Capabilities correlations for adversarial robustness datasets. Correlations reported as percentages. The metric used is attack failure rate for HarmBench splits.

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Dataset</b>	<b>Base Correlations (%)</b>	<b>Chat Correlations (%)</b>
ANLI [88]	-	74.5	81.5
AdvDemonstration [93]	-	57.9	63.9
HarmBench DirectRequest [97]	Biochemical	-58.0	-9.3
	Cybercrime	-59.0	-19.5
	Harassment	-46.6	-15.8
	Harmful	-54.3	7.3
	Illegal	-47.1	-9.8
	Misinfo	-53.9	-38.7
	All	-65.5	-18.2
HarmBench HumanJailbreak [97]	Biochemical	-49.6	-22.1
	Cybercrime	-73.8	-29.3
	Harassment	-85.5	-34.1
	Harmful	-74.6	-29.9
	Illegal	-71.1	-28.5
	Misinfo	-76.9	-41.6
	All	-79.2	-31.4
HarmBench TAP-T [97]	Biochemical	-62.0	-26.3
	Cybercrime	-60.0	-33.0
	Harassment	-77.1	-34.3
	Harmful	-59.4	-22.3
	Illegal	-68.9	-35.9
	Misinfo	-74.5	-56.8
	All	-78.7	-42.8
HarmBench GCG-T [97]	Biochemical	-55.8	-14.1
	Cybercrime	-74.9	-26.6
	Harassment	-57.7	-31.0
	Harmful	-48.2	-18.7
	Illegal	-60.5	-15.4
	Misinfo	-55.4	-35.5
	All	-61.5	-28.4

### A.6.8 Weaponization Capabilities

Table 21: Capabilities correlations for weaponization capabilities datasets. The metric used for CybersecEval2 was vulnerability detection rate for Exploit, safe suggestion rate for Instruct, Safe response rate for MITRE, attack failure rate for prompt injection, and accuracy for FRR. WMDP uses a score that inverts the accuracy.

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Dataset</b>	<b>Base Correlations (%)</b>	<b>Chat Correlations (%)</b>
WMDP [4]	All	-90.6	-88.6
	Biosecurity Split	-92.5	-87.5
	Chemical Security Split	-90.8	-81.1
	Cybersecurity Split	-88.4	-86.0
CybersecEval2 [142]	Exploit	-37.5	-50.3
	Instruct	-48.9	-85.8
	MITRE	-19.6	40.4
	Prompt Injection	-16.8	-18.6
	FRR	-44.2	-24.9

### A.6.9 Strict Instruction Following

Table 22: Capabilities correlations for strict instruction following datasets.

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Dataset</b>	<b>Base Correlations (%)</b>	<b>Chat Correlations (%)</b>
IFEval [143]	-	16.6	57.8
RuLES [144]	Basic	33.5	41.6
	Benign	35.7	23.5
	Red Team	0.0	16.1
	All	34.4	26.5

## A.7 Closed Source Model Evaluations: GPT-4o Capabilities Score




Figure 17: Recalculated scores for all the open source instruction-tuned and chat models we evaluated, plus GPT-4o.

In general, closed source models were excluded from our main paper analysis because of the technical challenges of calculating log probabilities and incompatibility with certain evaluation libraries. In this section, we compare the capabilities of GPT-4o with other open-source models using our analysis. To do so, we recompute all capabilities scores with all models including GPT-4o, while excluding BBH and LAMBADA from the capabilities score calculations. Table 23 contains our calculated scores of GPT-4o on the capabilities tasks, while in Figure 17 we observe clear gap between GPT-4o and the current open source models.

Capabilities Evaluation	GPT-4o Score
MMLU (full)	84.4
HellaSwag	91.5
ARC-Challenge	94.4
LogiQA	57.6
PIQA	95.8
WinoGrande	84.5
SuperGLUE (copa)	100.0
MedQA (4 options)	87.0
MATH	82.9
GSM8K	68.7

Table 23: Evaluation of GPT-4o on different capabilities tasks.